Celkem hlasů: 0
Sinn Fein has also been influenced by their assessment of the future. On the one hand, their leaders believed that they had recovered most of what they could obtain from the use of force. They also feared that they would not be able to maintain the IRA ceasefire much longer if they did not achieve a result by negotiating. But they also understood that by making significant concessions (for example. B by abandoning their insistence on relinquishing Britain`s sovereignty over Northern Ireland and accepting the principle of consent), they could turn time in their favour by obtaining a union agreed at the ballot box. Thus, the unionists` fears about the future and republican hopes led to the conclusion that this agreement, with all its painful compromises, was better than leaving and taking a chance for the future. the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) or Belfast Agreement (in Irish: Comhaontú Aoine à Chéasta or Comhaontú Bhéal Feirste); Ulster-Scots: Guid Friday Greeance or Bilfawst Greeance),  is a couple of agreements signed on 10 April 1998 that ended most of the violence of the Troubles, a political conflict in Northern Ireland that has emerged since the late 1960s. This was an important development in the peace process in Northern Ireland in the 1990s. Northern Ireland`s current system of de decentralised government is based on the agreement.
The Agreement also created a number of institutions between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, as well as between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom. The main problems that Sunningdale omitted and addressed in the Belfast Agreement are the principle of self-determination, the recognition of both national identities, Anglo-Irish intergovernmental cooperation and legal procedures to make power-sharing compulsory, such as inter-municipal voting and the D`Hondt system for appointing ministers for the executive.   Tommy McKearney, a former IRA member and journalist, argues that the main difference is the British government`s intention to negotiate a comprehensive agreement by involving the IRA and the more intransigent unionists.  With regard to the right to self-determination, the jurist Austen Morgan cites two qualifications. Firstly, the transfer of territories from one State to another must be done through an international agreement between the British and Irish Governments. Secondly, the people of Northern Ireland can no longer bring a united Ireland alone; they need not only the Irish Government, but also the citizens of their neighbouring country, Ireland, to support unity. Morgan also pointed out that, unlike the Ireland Act 1949 and the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, drawn up under Sunningdale, the 1998 Agreement and the resulting UK legislation explicitly provided for the possibility of a united Ireland.  The agreement consists of two interconnected documents, both agreed in Belfast on Good Friday, April 10, 1998: the British Government is virtually out of the equation and neither the British Parliament nor the British people have, under this agreement, the legal right to impede the achievement of Irish unity if it had the agreement of the north and south people.
Our nation is and will remain a nation of 32 counties. Antrim and Down are and will remain a part of Ireland, just like any county in the South.  One of the related features of the process, which has been decisive, has been sequencing – the willingness to move the process forward without a firm commitment to a lasting ceasefire and at least the first steps towards paramilitary groups taking their weapons out of service. . . .